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Abstract:  The EU has strained to find its identity as a security and defense power.  The 
EU, historically, has more experience and credibility in the area of its development policy.  
Given the EU’s history of development promotion and recent efforts to expand and clarify 
its foreign policy objectives, it should not be surprising that development and security 
goals often resemble each other. This paper argues that the conflation of traditional 
security concerns with the overall development policy of the EU indicates an expansion of 
and an effort to legitimize the EU’s foreign and security policy.  However, the lack of a 
clear distinction between security and development strategies acts as both a hindrance, in 
terms of operational clarity, and an asset, in terms of justification, to the formulation of a 
more coherent EU foreign policy, especially after the passage of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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The Lisbon Treaty allows for the creation of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), which brings together European Commission (EC) officials, 
member state diplomats, and the Council Secretariat into one agency responsible 
for representing the EU abroad in all areas relating to EU external action.  
Recently, however, European development non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) issued a legal warning concerning plans for the EEAS to take over 
development policy, claiming “that the new set-up will make development a 
mere pawn of foreign and security policy and that this is illegal under the Lisbon 
Treaty.”1  The Commission traditionally exercised sole authority over 
development policy, but the current plan for EU external action gives the new 
diplomatic service authority over development and even the humanitarian DG’s, 
raising fears that development cooperation and efficiency will decrease.  One 
EUobserver headline says it all:  “EU aid chief: merger with foreign policy 'over 
my dead body.'”2  Dutch Socialist MEP Thijs Berman stated "I don't know where 
the idea came from or how developed it is.  It may be a wrongly interpreted idea 
of efficiency or part of the inter-institutional power politics currently going on."3  
This paper argues that the idea came from the people.  Several recent 
articles discuss the phenomenon of the securitization of development policy in 
the EU and the world.4  Indeed, most studies take the two tacks Berman states, 
explaining the original rationale for coordinating different tools of foreign policy 
including aid to foster stability and therefore security in foreign countries, 
and/or the questions of inter-institutional rivalry and funding.   This paper takes 
a different approach explaining how the incorporation of development into the 
EEAS is used to legitimize the CFSP in the eyes of EU citizenry.   Despite the 
(im)practicalities involved, the politicians designed the EEAS to reflect the 
desires of the people that the EU be an independent Friedensmacht, (peacepower) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Leigh Phillips, “Development NGOs issue legal warning over new EU foreign service,” 
EUobserver, 27 April 2010, http://EUobserver.com/24/29953. 
2 Andrew Willis, “EU aid chief: merger with foreign policy 'over my dead body',” EUobserver, 18 
February 2011, http://euobserver.com/9/31831/?rk=1. 
3 Andrew Willis, “Outcry at EU plan to mix aid and foreign policy”, EUobserver, 10 February 
2011, http://euobserver.com/?aid=31786. 
4 See Amelia Hadfield, "Janus Advances? An Analysis of EC Development Policy and the 2005 
Amended Cotonou Partnership Agreement," European Foreign Affairs Review 12, 1 (2007): 39-66; 
Jörg Faust and Dirk Messner, "Europe's New Security Strategy: Challenges for Development 
Policy," European Journal of Development Research 17, 3 (2005): 423-436; Wil Hout, “Between 
Development and Security: The European Union, Governance, and Fragile States,” Working 
Paper 153. Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, February 2009; Richard Youngs, "Fusing 
Security and Development: Just Another Euro-platitude?" Journal of European Integration 30, 3 
(2008): 419-437; Marie V Gibert, “The Securitisation of the EU’s Development Agenda in Africa:  
Insights from Guinea-Bissau” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 10:4 (2009): 621-637; and 
Marie V Gibert, “The European Union in Africa:  The linkage between security, governance and 
development from an institutional perspective,” Journal of Development Studies 45:5 (2009): 789-
814. 
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or “civilian power with teeth”.  Polls show that the people believe EU member 
states are more effective as a collective force, desire an independent security and 
defense policy, distinct from that of the US, to be a “force for good”, and to foster 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  At the same time, they want the 
EU to deal with non-military threats such as terrorism and immigration, before 
they find their way on to European soil.  A coordinated external action service 
promises all that, but may have several unintended consequences such as 
negative press from NGOs and ineffective one-size-fits-all policies. 
The NGO Rebellion against Securitizing and Politicizing Aid 
 One of the claims made in academic literature and by the EU itself is that 
the EU is “unique among international organizations in its capacity to contribute 
to all three aspects of post-conflict stabilization: security (military and policing), 
economic and humanitarian, and political and institutional.”5  While the strength 
of and necessity for an EU military capable of projecting force outside of Europe 
is debatable, the strength of the EU as a civilian, or “soft”, power is reflected 
through its experience with development policies and its role in the world as one 
of the top providers of foreign aid.  This wide focus allows the EU to operate in 
countries and regions where non-security aid is essential and as a counter to US 
influence and power.  It has also allowed the EU to redefine its security and 
defense goals to include, among others, development policy outcomes.   
 However, a main source for the EU’s success as a donor was its apolitical 
nature.  Despite the fact that the Commission will retain control of its €6 billion a 
year development aid budget, and that the aid, development, energy and 
enlargement commissioners will take the lead in decision-making in their 
portfolios,6 many NGOs worry that politics will compromise the aid.  For 
example, High Representative Catherine Ashton promised the European 
Parliament, "I will give a high priority to the promotion of human rights and 
good governance around the world, to make sure that this is a silver thread that 
runs through everything we do."7  In other words, aid will have strings attached.  
In April 2010, Concord, the umbrella group of all European development 
groups together with CIDSE, the alliance of European Catholic development 
charities, Aprodev, its Protestant counterpart, and Eurostep, the secular aid 
coalition, threatened to sue.  Consulting White & Case, a UK law firm, they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Anand Menon, “Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten,” International Affairs 85, 2 (2009):  228; 
also see Christopher J. Bickerton, "The Perils of Performance: EU Foreign Policy and the Problem 
of Legitimization," Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs 28 (2007): 24-42; 
Richard G. Whitman, “Foreign, Security and Defence Policy and the Lisbon Treaty: significant or 
cosmetic reforms?” Global Europe Papers, 2008/1,  
http://www.swern.co.uk/esml/research/security/pdf/whitman.pdf. 
6 Andrew Rettman, “EU takes 'historic' step on new diplomatic service” EUobserver, 8 July 2010, 
http://euobserver.com/?aid=30448. 
7 Ibid.. 
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argued, "Development co-operation is outside the scope of the CFSP and 
therefore the EAS has no capacity in respect of it."8 
 Elise Ford, head of Oxfam International's EU office stated "Ashton's desire 
to set the direction of how EU development money is spent is potentially bad 
news. … Her proposal on the EU's first ever diplomatic service risks making 
poverty objectives hostage to foreign policy goals. It is now up to EU member 
states and the European Parliament to rectify Ashton's misconception about 
what effective development policy is."9 In a report by Oxfam titled “Whose Aid 
Is It Anyway?  Politicizing Aid in Conflicts and Crises”, the NGO warned that  
Aid organizations likewise need to ensure that their activities do not 
exacerbate or provide resources for conflict. They should implement 
standards and guidelines to ensure that humanitarian aid ‘does no harm’, 
and that development aid is sensitive to conflict. They should refuse any 
donor funding which is conditional on them cooperating with military 
forces or providing information to them, or which requires them to 
distribute aid or allocate development resources based on the political or 
military cooperation of recipients.10 
Indeed, being seen as partial or as political instruments could put aid workers in 
jeopardy while doing their jobs.  
 In an interview, Ross Mountain, the UN secretary-general's deputy special 
representative to the Democratic Republic of Congo and director-general of 
Development Assistance Research Associates Governments, argued that “aid is 
being increasingly driven by donors' political, economic or military objectives 
rather than prioritising the needs of its recipients.”  He explained: 
 Governments sometimes withhold aid in countries governed by people 
they don't like. But from a political perspective, we want to bring them 
back into the global community. What is the interest in withholding aid 
from their populations, if they are then of ill health and poorly educated 
when they finally do come in? They would then suffer twice, having lived 
under governments that are less than friendly and then be denied 
international assistance. It wouldn't be fair.11 
He commended the Commission as a multilateral aid giver; Mountain said that 
the "politicisation" of aid was "far more a phenomena of bilateral policies" than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Phillips, “Development NGOs issue legal warning over new EU foreign service,” EUobserver, 27 
April 2010. 
9 “The EU’s New Diplomatic Service,” EurActiv, published: 09 March 2010, updated: 08 February 
2011, http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/eus-new-diplomatic-service-linksdossier-309484. 
10 Synopsis of “Whose Aid Is It Anyway?  Politicizing Aid in Conflicts and Crises”, Oxfam 
International, 10 February 2011, http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/whose-aid-it-anyway.   
11 “UN official: Political interests are increasingly driving aid policy” EurActiv, 10 December 2010. 
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that of the multilateral EU, the world's largest aid donor.12  Usually bi-lateral 
donors, such as the US and France, have strings attached.   
However, Europe has started to attach strings, especially in its African 
policy and ACP aid policy overall as well:   
Aid or trade agreements have thus been exchanged against an African 
state’s readiness to accept the repatriation of citizens who had entered 
Europe illegally.  Conditionality can also be used to secure special 
agreements, whereby the African partner state agrees to a breach of its 
territorial sovereignty by allowing the EU to intervene directly on its 
territory.13 
The purpose is security.  Gibert explained:  “Promoting development and good 
governance is in the interest of the international community as a whole since it 
will help prevent local conflicts and insecurity from spilling over.”14   
Explaining the Connection:  Why ‘Securitize’ Development and Aid?   
 Securitization as a general concept can be defined as the movement of a 
policy considered part of “low politics” to the realm of “high politics,” otherwise 
known as security.  “Low” politics covers areas such as domestic economic, 
agricultural, and social policies. For the purposes of this paper, securitization of 
development refers to “the conscious injection of security concepts as part of the 
broader policy package dealing with the perceived security risks inherent in 
underdevelopment.”15  Perhaps the most explicit example of this “conscious 
injection” of security concepts is in the amended Cotonou Agreement.  The most 
contentious portion regards clauses that encourage and incentivize the African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) member states to cooperate on the issues of 
terrorism and non-proliferation and join the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
As will be discussed later in the paper, such demands seem to be superfluous 
within the context of an economic and development cooperation agreement; 
however, it is reflective of the aims of the EU with regard to the conflation of 
development and security strategies.   
 The European Security Strategy (ESS) begins by stating, “Europe has 
never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free.”16  The Council acknowledges 
from the onset that recent EU experiences in the Balkans highlight the need for a 
security strategy that will address the issues directly related to the European 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 “Report denounces humanitarian aid 'politicisation', lauds EU” EurActiv, 10 December 2010. 
13 Gibert, “The Securitisation of the EU’s Development Agenda in Africa:  Insights from Guinea-
Bissau,” 625. 
14 Ibid, 623. 
15 Hadfield, “Janus Advances?” 54. 
16 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in A Better World: European Security Strategy, 
Brussels, 12 December 2003: 1, accessed 31 March 2010, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 
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neighborhood, but attention quickly shifts to areas beyond Europe. The Council 
asserts that because the EU has become more of a “credible and effective actor” 
in global affairs it must “share in the responsibility for global security and in 
building a better world.”17  Global security, at least in the context of this 
document, encompasses a wide range of issues from food and human security to 
failed states.  The ESS argues that the implementation of its security policy 
requires multiple instruments, “ranging from military force to diplomatic 
engagement, trade relations, development aid and humanitarian assistance.”18 In 
essence, the Council espouses the need for a comprehensive security strategy by 
including all its available resources. 
 Perhaps the most important point the document makes is that “security is 
a precondition for development.”19 At this point, the distinction between 
development and security starts to disappear.  While the document explicitly 
states that security is a precondition for development, the strategy claims that 
issues such as poverty and disease give rise to “pressing security concerns,” 
especially in developing countries.20 The ESS, by nature, clearly has more of a 
focus on the importance of establishing security in developing and post-conflict 
states, but the insertion of language that attempts to place sufficient emphasis on 
the need for development, emergency, and humanitarian assistance effectively 
blurs the distinction between the two seemingly separate areas of development 
and security. 
 The document highlights another crucially important goal: the focus on 
the promotion of good governance and institution building. The strategy 
envisions a stronger international order through “spreading good governance, 
supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of 
power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights.”21 Drawing on 
the success of the European integration process as evidenced through the EU’s 
history and evolution, the ESS sets the foundation for exporting the EU model of 
governance, or at the very least the exportation of European values.  Whether or 
not this strategy is effective or even desired by the countries in which the EU 
operates is beyond the scope of this paper; however, the focus on good 
governance, social reform, and development assistance in the ESS seems to have 
a significant impact on the role of development policy. 
 If foreign policy, in general, and the EU’s, in particular, are “consciously 
designed to aggregately define the values and deploy the interests of a given 
actor in a comprehensive, coherent policy palette,”22 then the ESS can be viewed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid, 1. 
18 Hout “Between Development and Security,” 8. 
19 Council, European Security Strategy, 2. 
20 Ibid, 2. 
21 Ibid, 10. 
22 Hadfield, “Janus Advances?” 47. 
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as an articulation of European values and interests.  One of the glaring criticisms 
of the ESS is that it does not offer any input on how to make the security strategy 
comprehensive. While it includes language that incorporates a focus on 
development and humanitarian assistance, institution building in failed and 
fragile states, and the new security threats of terrorism and non-proliferation, it 
does not offer any sort of guidance on how to deal with the complex linkages 
between the issues.23 EU development policy, on the other hand, offers a clearer 
way to deal with the linkages, although the circular nature of causality in the 
development/security relationship proves too complex, as will be shown in the 
following section. 
EU Development Policy: Security, Cotonou, and Harmonization 
 EC officials began formulating revisions and amendments to the Cotonou 
Agreement shortly after the publications of the ESS.  Cotonou went into effect in 
2000 with the understanding that the signatories could make necessary revisions 
in 2005 and every five years as needed.  The agreement, which codifies EU 
assistance to ACP countries through the EC, replaced the previous Yaoundé and 
Lomé convention agreements.  The new agreement emphasizes, “politicized and 
securitized reform-focused goals” and represents a “paradigm shift from the 
original assistance-focused development that typified the Yaoundé and Lomé 
accords” by attaching political conditionality in the areas of democracy, good 
governance, and human rights to aid guarantees.24 By stressing political 
conditionality through the Cotonou agreement, the EU attempted to formalize its 
new, comprehensive approach to security through development. 
 An analysis of the Cotonou agreement is appropriate for a number of 
reasons.  First off, its ratification occurred during the debate within in the EU 
over what form the new security strategy should take.  Similarly, during this 
time, the EU sought to harmonize, and is still in the process of harmonizing, 
development policy between Brussels and the member states within the 
framework of the ESS.  The EU has a number of regional economic and trade 
cooperation agreements, notably with South America, but the focus on the ACP 
region is logical because the EU is most actively involved in these member states; 
most CSDP missions take place in Africa. 
 The Council argues that the EU must utilize all its tools to tackle the 
pressing security concerns associated with developing countries. Most important 
is the mention of the need to incorporate all its assistance programs: “The 
challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: 
European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military 
and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Faust et al., “Europe’s New Security Strategy,” 427. 
24 Hadfield, “Janus Advances?” 41, 43. 
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can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries.”25  Funding for 
ACP development comes from the European Development Fund (EDF).  Explicit 
mention of the EDF in the security strategy and the linkages between such 
programs and the security of the EU and its member states reinforces the 
argument that securitization of development is a crucial aspect of promoting 
global security. In essence, the Council equates EU security with security in third 
countries. 
 Far from maintaining a narrow approach to poverty reduction and 
economic and trade cooperation, the Cotonou Agreement incorporates political 
cooperation and dialogue into its goals.  In the introduction to the revised 2005 
agreement, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid 
Louis Michel lauds the agreement as a more constructive way to approach the 
issue of poverty and meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): 
The key objective of developing a more strategic common approach to 
poverty reduction must continue to be steadily promoted. The social, 
economic, political, cultural and environmental aspects of sustainable 
development are integrated throughout the Agreement, reflecting the 
relevant international commitments taken by EU and ACP partners…. The 
amendments place greater emphasis on an effective and results-orientated 
dialogue rendering the provisions on good governance, human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law more constructive and 
operational.26 
The amendments largely focus on the political dimension of economic and 
development assistance.  Little from the original agreement regarding trade and 
economic cooperation changed, suggesting that the strategic outlook of the 
Commission changed between 2000 and 2005.  
 The Preamble of the agreement acknowledges the key areas of 
cooperation between the EU and the ACP states.  Reinforcing the notion of 
cooperation, especially in the new areas identified by the ESS, it states, “a 
political environment guaranteeing peace, security and stability, respect for 
human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and good governance is 
part and parcel of long term development.”27  Again, good governance is a 
crucial element for both security and development.  Both the ESS and Cotonou 
agreement focus on the importance of good governance and respect for 
democracy, which reflects the criteria established for determining aid allocation. 
 As a result, the most contentious aspect of the Cotonou Agreement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Council, European Security Strategy, 13. 
26 European Commission, Partnership Agreement: ACP-EC, Directorate-General for Development 
and Relations with African, Caribbean, and Pacific States, signed 23 June 2000, revised 25 June 
2005: 5, accessed 23 March 2010,  http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/ 
repository/Cotonou_EN_2006_en.pdf.  
27 Commission, Partnership Agreement: ACP-EC, Preamble. 
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revisions in 2005 is the inclusion of security-related provisions as part of the 
political conditionality of EC-provided development aid.  Article 11 dictates that 
ACP states must cooperate in the areas of the prevention of mercenary and 
terrorist activities, WMD proliferation, and human rights abuses through 
participation in various international agreements, including ICC membership.28  
Much of the debate centered on the ICC and WMD provisions, but ultimately the 
ACP states agreed to the revisions.  This instance typifies EU security objectives 
as they relate to development: security is a precondition for development.  
Essentially the EU forces ACP members to address the threats of terrorism, 
mercenaries, and the spread of nuclear weapons (albeit with some EU assistance) 
coupled with measures to ensure accountability. 
 An important aspect of the Cotonou Agreement with regard to the 
securitization and politicization of the development agreement concerns the 
structure of decision-making process within the framework of the agreement.  
Article 15 explicitly states that the Council of Ministers, the body with the 
responsibility to foster political dialogue and implement decisions, will consist of 
members from the EC, the Council, EU member states, and representatives from 
the ACP member states.29 Since the EC maintains sole competence with regard to 
development policy and controls the distribution of EDF aid, it seems puzzling 
that the Council and EU member states would need to be intimately involved in 
policy implementation; however, the focus on the need for continuing political 
dialogue in conjunction with a more comprehensive approach as laid out in the 
ESS suggests that such increased involvement at the EU-level is inevitable. 
 With regard to political dialogue as defined in the Cotonou Agreement, 
the document clearly emphasizes the need to formulate a comprehensive set of 
EC and ACP policies. In order to succeed in the mutual goals, the agreement 
states the need for parties to pursue policies “to promote peace and to prevent, 
manage and resolve violent conflicts…” and that  “take full account of the 
objective of peace and democratic stability in the definition of priority areas of 
cooperation.”30  Again, this reflects the notion that security must come before any 
serious development progress can be made and underscores the EC’s attention 
on the development and security issues inherent in failing, fragile, and 
developing states. 
 The Cotonou Agreement mandates that fragile states will receive 
prioritized funds to improve institutional capacity. Article 10.3 states that 
“[G]ood governance shall underpin the domestic and international policies of the 
Parties and constitute a fundamental element of this agreement.”31  However, 
some critics have observed that when the EU does include governance and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid, Article 11. 
29 Ibid, Article 15. 
30 Ibid, Article 8. 
31 Ibid, Article 10.3. 
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institution-building measures into its overall strategy, they tend to be highly 
technocratic in nature at the expense of other equally important objectives.32  
Similarly, civil and political society actors within the fragile states often “criticize 
the EU’s governance assistance for being heavily orientated towards government 
and state institutions.”33  While Article 7 singles out the importance of civil 
society involvement, in practice the EDF allocates more funding for institution-
building objectives in fragile states. This makes sense in light of the objectives of 
the Cotonou Agreement and the Consensus. 
 At the heart of this focus on failing states, and thus the adoption of 
preventative policies, is the understanding that insecurity is both the cause and 
effect of poverty and lack of development. Conceptual ambiguity is evident 
throughout the Cotonou Agreement and the Consensus on Development.  The 
EP, Council, and the EC, in their attempt to formulate a coherent development 
policy and harmonize the efforts of the EU and its member states, fail to 
distinguish security and development goals.   In outlining policy toward failing 
states and its role in post-crisis situations, the Consensus states its actions “will 
be guided by integrated transition strategies, aiming at rebuilding institutional 
capacities, essential infrastructure and social services, increasing food security 
and providing sustainable solutions for refugees, displaced persons and the 
general security of citizens.”34   General security remains undefined, although 
presumably addressed through institution-building efforts and security sector 
assistance. In short, development tools and good governance can best deal with 
issues that arise in post-crisis situations. 
 As a document outlining development objectives, it is not surprising that 
a considerable amount of attention is devoted to the subjects of humanitarian 
assistance, social and economic reforms, and the need for “good governance.”  
The Consensus suffers from the same issues as the ESS in that it attempts to 
include language that acknowledges the need for security while simultaneously 
providing no clear distinction or definition as to when to prioritize development 
or security actions.  Instead of providing a clear distinction between objectives, it 
is assumed that the objectives of both policies are separate yet complementary: 
“Within their respective actions, they contribute to creating a secure environment 
and breaking the vicious cycle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and 
failing economic, social and political structures.”35  The conceptual ambiguity 
stems from the inability of the policy-makers to identify whether insecurity 
causes or is the consequence of underdevelopment.  EC officials had to 
reformulate development policy objectives, incorporating a “securitized” 
element to address the inherent security challenges associated with both the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Hout, “Between Development and Security,” 4. 
33 Youngs, “Fusing Security and Development,” 433 
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“origins and outcomes of poverty.”36 
Critiques of Securitizing of Aid 
The inclusion of political conditionality reflects the shift to reform-focused 
goals, but the question remains as to whether or not this shift will actually help 
recipient countries, especially those with ACP membership, maintain an 
acceptable level of security, stability, and legitimacy. The EU’s foreign policy 
objectives, as argued previously, reflect its own values and interests, yet there is 
considerable criticism of the concept of political conditionality of aid which 
suggests that it could possibly lead to governments in target states that merely 
pay lip service to the notion of free, democratic states.37  In other words, does the 
increased threat of withheld funding really help the EU in its development and 
security aims?  One Wikileaks document suggests not:  The US embassy in 
London reported in October 2009 that UK Foreign Office West Africa team leader 
Paul Welsch was very concerned about human rights in The Gambia.  Welsch 
reported that The Gambia is “’not taking seriously’ the EU Article 8 consultations 
[of Cotonou].  No ministers have participated in the dialogue thus far.  Welsch 
said the UK is not expecting much from the next meeting at the end of November 
when the EU Presidency will send a representative to Banjul.”38   
Another criticism is the lack of distinction between security and 
development policy creates an impression that “EU still has no clearly thought-
out vision of the balance or direction of causality between these two policy goals, 
but rather an ad hoc approach”39 devoid of structure.  The ESS, the Consensus on 
Development and the Cotonou Agreement all contain traditional development- 
and security-related language with no synthesis or clear justification behind the 
reasoning for the inclusion. 
Gibert wonders whether such a “one-size-fits-all” policy really works in 
Africa, the second-largest continent, but often referred to by Westerners as a 
single entity.  For example, Gibert explained: 
The EU’s resort to the UK to lead the SSR preparatory missions in Guinea-
Bissau on the basis of its experience in Sierra Leone points to a ready-
made technical agenda rather than an understanding of the country’s 
history and politics, which are extremely different from Sierra Leone’s.  
Making a locally owned agenda out of an externally-induced approach is 
notoriously difficult and requires a solid understanding of local politics so 	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that universal rules of democracy and state efficiency can be implemented 
in a manner that is respectful of local needs. This, in turn, demands a long-
term approach and a substantial commitment on the part of the 
international community – a need that can be at odds with the 
international community’s own, immediate interests.40 
 
Gibert also sees many of many of the CSDP missions as either band-aid 
measures or feel good missions that will have no long-term effect.  For example, 
EUNAVFOR that combats piracy off the Horn of Africa is a bit like swatting flies:  
Although one may hit or miss one’s target, the source of the pirates, Somalia, will 
keep producing pirates until the EU gets involved in the formation of a political 
solution rather than a military, naval approach or a developmentally focused 
one.41  
EU Public Opinion and the Credibility of EU Foreign Policy 
Why has the securitization of EU development policy occurred? The 
natural linkage between security and development concerns has played a role in 
the process, but it seems that there must be some other factor.  Bickerton 
observes that, “Conjoining the term legitimacy with both the EU and foreign 
policy may appear quixotic: the EU is beset with a series of legitimacy problems 
that go under the title ‘democratic deficit,’ and foreign policy is traditionally a 
prerogative power of the executive, thus limiting its need for legitimacy.”42  By 
including development policy within the confines of the CFSP, and now the 
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the EU is justifying the expansion 
of its foreign policy to the public and the world.   
The first goal mentioned in the Treaty on European Union for the CFSP is 
“to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and 
integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter.”43  This goal raises a couple of questions.  First, why is safeguarding 
“values” the primary objective of the CFSP?  Second, if these values are in 
conformity with the principles of the United Nations, and all the EU member 
states have already promised to support them – and do – in the UN, why do 
these values need to be reiterated in the Treaty on European Union?   
Javier Solana answered these questions; he recognized that defining 
European values creates a vital link with the EU citizen: 
the defense and promotion of the values […] are at the heart of European 
history and civilisation. We believe in the value of tolerance, democracy 	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and respect for human rights. This must be an integral part of our policy-
making process. Because values are our crucial link with the people of the 
street, who want to understand why we take this or that decision, and 
whose support we need at all times [sic].44 
Solana understood, that, properly cultivated, foreign policy based on common 
values can create a link with and among the people.    
William Bloom explained that foreign policy is a powerful tool for 
identity-building whether consciously understood by decision-makers or not.   
Foreign policy can create a situation in which the mass of people can perceive a 
threat to their communal identity, or an opportunity to protect and enhance it.45  
As a result, “the opportunity is always present for a government deliberately to 
use foreign policy as a method of mobilizing the mass national public sentiment 
away from internal political dissension, and achieving political integration.”46  
A key component of identity-building is creating legitimacy for the 
governing institutions.  Prizel explained, “Most modern polities rely on a 
legitimizing mythology.  The conduct of foreign policy, by extension, is one 
means of affirming that mythology and thereby legitimizing a governing elite.”47  
The French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty were the equivalent 
of the EU governing elite losing a vote of confidence from the people.  To regain 
the people's trust, EU politicians emphasized the practicality of a European 
foreign and security policy.  Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner 
for External Relations, said that the EU had taken advantage of the pause after 
the constitutional failure  
to reconnect with our citizens’ most important concerns -- security, 
stability, prosperity and a stronger EU in the world.  We recognize that 
what our citizens want is results.  So we are concentrating on concrete 
achievements to show that the EU is part of the solution and not part of 
the problem.  And to show that rather than an “old continent”, unable to 
respond today's challenges we've become a relevant dynamic power.48 
Presumably, Solana understood the concept when he called for 
"legitimacy through action" and "result oriented" pragmatism to gain the citizens’ 	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confidence.49  Chris Patten, former Commissioner for External Relations 
concurred:  “the EU’s credibility will be greatly enhanced if it can demonstrate its 
contribution to the safety and security of its citizens.”50  He continued, “I am 
confident this debate will be one of the most appealing to European citizens, one 
which will make them feel more and more ‘euro-activists’.”51 
As Solana explained, the CFSP is “also part of a specific project, to know 
the ambition to promote a model of integration and cooperation.”52 In its White 
Paper on European governance, the Commission explained how international 
action could be translated into citizen support: 
The objectives of peace, growth, employment and social justice pursued 
within the Union must also be promoted outside for them to be effectively 
attained at both European and global level. This responds to citizens' 
expectations for a powerful Union on a world stage. Successful 
international action reinforces European identity and the importance of 
shared values within the Union.53 
The Member States in the European Council agreed in the Laeken Presidency 
conclusions: 
Within the Union, the European institutions must be brought closer to its 
citizens. Citizens undoubtedly support the union's broad aims, but they 
do not always see a connection between those goals and the Union's 
everyday action. … Now that the Cold War is over and we are living in a 
globalised, yet also highly fragmented world, Europe needs to shoulder its 
responsibilities in the governance of globalisation. The role it has to play is 
that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror, and all 
fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world’s heartrending 
injustices.  In short, a power wanted to change the course of world affairs 
in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest.  
A power seeking to set globalization within a moral framework, in other 
words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development. …  The 
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image of a democratic and globally engaged Europe admirably matches 
citizens’ wishes [emphasis added].54 
Indeed, the EEAS does match the citizens’ wishes. Although 82 percent of 
Europeans want a European foreign policy independent of that of the United 
States,55 and 76 percent want the European Union to exert strong leadership in 
world affairs, 79 percent believe the European Union should concentrate on its 
economic power and not rely on its military power when dealing with 
international problems outside Europe.56  Only 46 percent believe the European 
Union should strengthen its military power in order to play a larger role in the 
world.  Furthermore, 87 percent of Europeans agree with the statement 
“economic power is more important in world affairs than military power.”57  The 
Europeans want to be a strong force in the world, but a civilian force.  In Das 
Parlament, the EU was dubbed a Friedensmacht or “peace-power”.58   The 
Schroeder government deemed it “A Civilian Power with Teeth”.59  As Pace 
argues, the EU’s wishes to describe itself as a “force for good”.60 
In 2006, the EC conducted a qualitative survey over the course of several 
months.  The survey sought to determine European citizens’ perceptions about 
the future role of Europe in the world.  While previous Eurobarometer polls asked 
similar questions, this survey discovered a more nuanced understanding of the 
public’s perceptions, most notably regarding the EU’s role in foreign policy.  In 
2001, 71 percent of EU citizens felt that EU foreign policy should be decided at 
both the national and EU levels, reflecting the common feeling that the EU 
should function on more of an intergovernmental basis.61  However, the 
qualitative study reflects some of the common and contradictory views, namely 
that the EU is largely ineffective in implementing its foreign policy due to a lack 
of cooperation between the EU and member states, yet citizens, on the whole, 	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tend to be suspicious of any action that would infringe upon their national 
sovereignty. 
 When asked to identify any significant achievements of the EU, the 2006 
study found that respondents frequently signaled out EU aid to developing 
countries, often in conjunction with the acknowledgement that the EU has been 
able to provide tangible benefits such as infrastructure development and other 
restoration works within the EU itself.62 When pressed further, respondents, 
especially in older member states as well as newer ones, cited the benefits of 
cohesion policies that they experienced.  In 2010, despite the global economic 
recession and euro financial crisis, European citizens, 89 percent, demonstrated 
resolute support for continuing foreign development aid.  Moreover, 66 percent 
believed that the EU should honor, or even improve, on its promises to increase 
development aid to 0.7 percent of GNI by 2015, the deadline for achieving the 
Millennium Development Goal.  In this context, 76 percent of Europeans believe 
that there is added value in EU countries working together, thereby avoiding 
duplication and ensuring aid effectiveness.63  Regardless of country or region, a 
significant majority attributed failure to “the lack of unity between the States, the 
lack of collective spirit, the prevalence of ‘selfish’ interests” especially in the area 
of external policy, commonly characterized as weak due to lack of “European” 
influence and initiative.64  
 The public largely views the EU as ineffective, at least with regard to its 
external policy.  Respondents showed little specific knowledge about the external 
affairs of the EU, but a majority across borders felt that EU action in external 
matters is not as effective as possible.  It is interesting to note that a vast majority 
of respondents indicated that action on the European level is inherently more 
effective than on the individual member state level in guaranteeing both 
individual and collective security.65  Security cooperation represents one of the 
major areas of unmet expectations and simultaneously, hopeful expectation.  The 
survey indicates that despite the perception that EU action in external affairs 
amounts to little more than a cacophony of voices and interests, EU citizens feel 
that effective action is possible. 
 The problem is that member states are perceived as utterly unable to 
present any sort of common, united position on the international scene, “in 
particular vis-à-vis the United States.”66  While some respondents feared loss of 	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national sovereignty due to involvement in some conflict in opposition to their 
personal values or political views, notably in Ireland and Greece, most felt that if 
the EU was able to form consensus to defend its economic and political interests 
it would be able to be a more effective and responsive international actor.67  The 
European Consensus on Development explicitly addresses these expectations 
and failures, stating, “the EU will strengthen policy coherence for development 
procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels.”68 
 What could increase the visibility of the EU on the international scene?  
Again, the survey offers an answer for EU policymakers. Expectations for Europe 
in the future are listed in descending order from the highest to the lowest as they 
pertain to EU actions:  economic development (guaranteeing everyone, countries 
and individuals alike, a higher standard of living), standardized and generous 
social policies, support to and harmonization of educational systems, an efficient 
security policy capable of fighting terrorism, protection of the environment, and 
a common external policy.69   It is logical that EU policymakers would like to 
include development policy within the framework of the EEAS as it has more 
visibility internally and more tangible, wide-ranging effects externally. 
The Developmentalization of Security Policy? 
Thus far, this paper has argued that the EU has securitized development 
policy although the rampant conceptual ambiguity in official policy 
pronouncements and actions adds to the confusion surrounding the actual 
identity of EU foreign policy.  This confusion suggests a plausible argument that 
the EU has developmentalized security policy.  The creation of the so-called 
rapid reaction force remains hypothetical as the EU focuses on the smaller and 
more politically feasible small battle groups initiative.70  The previously 
mentioned limits of the ESDP, now CSDP, help to reinforce the perception of the 
EU as primarily a civilian power.  The overwhelming majority of CSDP missions 
are civilian in nature.  If the EU is unable to form its own defensive force due to 
its basic institutional structure and competing national interests and 
expectations, then developmentalizing the security and defense policy by the 
inclusion of preventative policies, including development in terms of policy and 
practice makes imminent sense.  From a security and defense standpoint, adding 
development strategies is a politically inexpensive way to increase both stature 
and visibility without having to commit to any sort of serious defense or military 	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build-up. 
 If the purpose of European defense is conflict prevention and intervention 
in crises if necessary, then it makes sense that the EU should pursue a more 
integrated approach to provide security for its citizens and promote its values 
throughout the world.71  The further encroachment of the EU, specifically the 
Council Secretariat and member state diplomatic corps, obviously represents a 
threat to the development community, but it also represents an opportunity for 
the EU through the EEAS to expand and justify its foreign policy objectives.  
Securitization fears dominate the debate about the future of the EU’s external 
policy, at least within the development community.  However, with the EU 
becoming more involved in development policy horizontally (that is, allowing 
member states and the Council Secretariat more influence), it is logical to assume 
that the EU is developmentalizing its security policy at least to an extent. 
 The ESS and Consensus on Development both stress the need for 
increased cooperation in the areas of security and development, respectively.  
Since the EU is a major provider of development aid and simultaneously handles 
the political implications of its development policy, giving the EEAS competency 
in the EU’s foreign policy makes sense, at least in terms of streamlining inter-
institutional dialogue.72  The intricate nexus between security and development 
also suggest that such an arrangement is desirable from the standpoint of the EU 
as a major international actor.73 For the EU to appear as and act like an effective 
actor, it needs to assume responsibility in a wide number of areas traditionally 
left up to its member states, from development to security and defense to 
diplomacy. 
 The legal warning issued to the EU over the role of the EEAS in 
development  and humanitarian policy rests on the perception that the EC will 
lose control over it, giving too much authority to the HR and subsequently 
member state governments.  Essentially, the EC delegations will serve as the 
basis for the new EU diplomatic service and will even be staffed by EC officials at 
least in part.  From a practical standpoint, it is illogical to assume that EC officials 
in charge of development in third countries will lose a significant amount of 
influence over the implementation of development policy.  In a leaked US State 
Department cable, Glenys Kinnock, UK Africa Minister stated that the UK was 
actively working within the EU to ensure that the Development and 
Humanitarian commissioners would keep control of their own budgets to 
minimize politicization.74 	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 An EU official close to the HR, as quoted in the EUobserver article 
concerning the legal warning, claimed, “development policy yesterday, today 
and tomorrow will be based on the [main] instrument adopted on development 
policy,” namely the EDF, and that rules governing the use of EDF money will not 
change with the establishment of the EEAS.75  Fears about the politicization of 
EU foreign aid are justified, but the process of politicizing, or securitizing, 
development policy in the EU has continued for years, at the very least since the 
formulation of the ESS in 2003.  Efforts to coordinate and consolidate 
development policy between the member states and the EU are ongoing 
processes. If the previous experience with formulating and carrying out 
European-level diplomacy serves as a clear example, then the role of 
development within the context of the EU’s external policy is likely to remain 
unclear or unchanged. 
Conclusion 
 The EU has struggled to create its identity as a credible actor on the 
international scene since the inception of the CFSP in 1993.  It has received much 
criticism from within and outside its borders for being unable to act quickly and 
decisively on the European level; however, as security and development goals 
increasingly converged through official policy and pronouncements and actions, 
EU foreign policy has gained more credibility internally and externally, at least 
in terms of cementing its reputation as primarily a civilian power. The EU will 
continue to operate internationally through ESDP missions, but now the EU faces 
the challenge of meeting expectations that it will assert itself more aggressively 
on the international level, predominantly through effective utilization of 
development strategy as part of its overall security and defense strategies.  
 The previous analysis of the ESS, Consensus on Development and the 
revised 2005 Cotonou Agreement highlights some of the issues that the EEAS 
still faces.  The circular nature of causality in the security/development link 
ensures that, regardless of how comprehensive the structural changes made 
through the Lisbon Treaty are, prioritizing certain approaches remains one of the 
most important challenges for the EU.   The lack of a clear distinction between 
security and development policies remains.  Uncertainty over the legality of 
placing development or humanitarian policy under the control of the EEAS on 
both the side of the public and the EU merely highlights the issues that the 
Consensus and ESS failed to adequately address. 
 The structural limitations of the EU, namely its largely intergovernmental 
approach to most issues with regard to external action, have hindered much 
meaningful progress over the past several years.  There is still no clear timeline 
for the creation of the rapid reaction force, and the EU suffers from criticism that 	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it has no clear guidelines for participating in crisis management operations. The 
creation of the EEAS is one step in the process of justifying the need for an EU 
foreign policy, and it seems that incorporating development will enhance its 
effectiveness, although it remains to be seen. 
 If the EU projects its values across the globe through its foreign policy, 
then actively injecting development policy into its overall strategy makes 
imminent sense.   Eurobarometer data suggest that the public largely views the EU 
as a credible and effective actor, especially vis-à-vis the United States, and more 
able to project and defend European values.  The close association between 
development policy and the generous social policies common in the EU provides 
European policymakers the opportunity to justify to European citizens the 
necessity for more active foreign involvement at little to no political cost. 
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